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DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF
LAW: OF STRANGERS BEARING STALE
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS
ROBERT
I.

L.

FELIX*

INTRODUCTION

Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories,Inc. I and Nichols v. Sterling
Drug Conipany2 are two products liability cases brought to South
Carolina solely because of its long six year limitation period for
personal injury suits. 3 These claims by non-residents against for-

eign drug companies arising from out-of-state injuries were
barred by the statutes of limitation of the states in which suit
might be expected.4 Little quarrel can be made with the results
in the two cases. The Court of Appeals held that the facts
presented as a basis for in personam jurisdiction were insufficient
"contacts, ties, or relations" to satisfy the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
In Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories,Inc., defendant's activities
in South Carolina were limited to solicitation by mail to dealers
and wholesalers, and. the mailing of promotional literature to
approximately 650 doctors. In Nichols v. SterlingDrug Co., Ster*

Professor of Law, University of South Carolina: B.A. 1956, LL.B. 1959, University

of Cincinnati; M.A. 1962, University of British Columbia; LL.M. 1967, Harvard University.
1. 444 F. 2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1972), reh. denied, 404
U.S. 1006 (1972).
2. Id. Both cases were decided on a consolidated interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1971). The district court had denied defendants' motion to set aside
.the service of summons and dismiss the complaint.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-143 (1962). The South Carolina version of the Uniform Commercial Code also sets a limitation period of six years, presumably in anticipation of the
imposition of warranty liability for bodily injury claims as well as other claims arising
under the Code. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-318, 10.2-725 (1966).
4. In Ratliff suit might have been instituted in Florida (domicile of the-plaintiff and
place where the injury occurred); or in Delaware (place of incorporation of the defendant);
or in Connecticut (defendant's principal place of business). In Nichols, suit might have
been instituted in Indiana (domicile of the plaintiff and place where the injury occurred);
or in Delaware (place of incorporation of the defendant); or in New York (defendant's
principal place of business). In each potential .forum, however, the state's respective
statute of limitation had run. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (1968); DELA. CODE ANN. 10
§ 8118 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (Cum. supp. 1972); IND. ANN.STAT. § 2-602 (Cum.
supp. 1962); and N.Y. Crvm PRAcTicE LAw AND RumEs § 214 (McKinney 1972).
5. 444 F.2d at 746.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1973

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEW

[Vol. 25

ling Drug's activities in South Carolina were more extensive than
those of Cooper Laboratories. Sterling maintained five "detail
men" who lived in South Carolina and promoted Sterling's products through personal contacts with doctors and drugstores in the
state. It had also filed application for and been given authority
to do business in South Carolina and had appointed an agent for
service of process.' To require these defendants to defend stale
claims in an uninterested forum was held to trespass the bounds
of "traditional notions of justice and fair play."
Judge Craven treats the cases as factually indistinguishable
for the purposes of the decision: "Here the activities of the defendant corporations in South Carolina, although possibly sufficient
to constitute 'presence'are nonetheless minimal."' 7 Judge Craven
is a practical man' and basing the decision on due process standards for state judicial jurisdiction is a practical direction for the
development of minimal constitutional standards within the doctrine of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.' It is also a pragmatic use of federalism. The court's restraint in picking a jurisdictional solution leaves untravelled the choice of law route and
the hazards of reforming state conflict of laws rules for the selection of limitation periods. Thus the decision leaves much to academic speculation regarding the Erie-Klaxon doctrine10 and the
degree to which a federal court in diversity jurisdiction shall follow state law in jurisdictional and choice of law matters.
The cases pose specifically and suggest generally a number
of issues relating to jurisdiction and choice of law in diversity
jurisdiction. These are not cases against defendants "with which
6. See, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-23.1 to 12-23.16 (Cum. supp. 1971). Section 12-23.1 (c)
provides:
The provisions of this section shall not be deemed to establish a standard
for activities which may subject a foreign corporation to service of process under
this chapter or any other statute of this State.
In Nichols it was stipulated regarding the detail men that "their primary responsibility
is the promotion of drugs, not the actual sale of them." 444 F.2d at 746.
7. 444 F.2d at 748 [emphasis added].
8. For elaboration of Judge Craven's judicial philosophy see his Paean to
Pragmatism,50 N.C. L. Rav. 977 (1972).
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) requires a federal court to decide
according to state law those matters reserved to the states by the Constitution. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), requires the federal court in diversity
jurisdiction to follow the applicable conflict-of-law rules of the state in which it is sitting.
For comments in this review see Symposium: Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Revisited, 17
S.C.L. REv. 467 (1965).
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the state has no contacts, ties, or relations"" at all. Something
more than the use of the due process clause as a residual check
on state law is inferable from the complex of factors identified in
the court's statement of the issue: "Are the activities of the drug
companies extensive enough in South Carolina to warrant in personam jurisdiction when the plaintiffs are non-residents and the
causes of action arose outside the forum and were unconnected
with defendant's activities in South Carolina?"' To suggest a
distinction between the two cases may be analytically useful.
Ratliff is just too easy a case to require more than a statement
that a foreign corporation may not be sued solely on the basis of
correspondence with persons in the state except as to matters
arising from the correspondence. It is the facts of Nichols that
give meaning to the test of "a rational nexus" between the forum
6tate and the relevant facts surrounding the claims presented. 3
Nichols gives practical significance to the requirement that contacts between the corporation and the state must be "fairly extensive"" if the plaintiff's injury does not arise out of something done
in the forum state. The implication that the "presence" of a
corporation is not enough to meet due process standards appears
to restrict the concept of transitory actions. If jurisdiction were
accepted, the requirement that the court must follow the choice
of law rules of the state in which it is sitting would compound the
unsuitability of the forum. The prospect of a change of venue
adds still another complication to the choice of law issue. It is the
purpose of this article to explore these issues.
II.

DuE PROCESS

The minimum contacts theory of Justice Stone's opinion in
InternationalShoe emphasizes that the maintenance of suit
against foreign defendants must not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice." 5 Against the catalog of inconveniences to the corporation must be balanced the appropriateness of the particular suit in the forum selected. Two points
11. 444 F.2d at 747, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945) [emphasis added].
12. Id. at 747.
13. Id. at 748.
14. Id., quoting F. JAMES, CWL PROCEDURE § 12.8 at 640 (1965).
15. 326 U.S. at 316.
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may be noted. First, when the defendant is a corporation doing
interstate business the inconveniences of suit in a given forum
may pose few or no problems of practical as distinguished from
legal significance. 6 In the federal courts, the practical problems
posed by the original choice of forum can be avoided or mitigated
by a change of venue." Second, Justice Stone does not expressly
give controlling effect to the contact of the forum with the facts
upon which the claim for relief is based. The forum's contact with
the cause of action is a matter to be considered on a case by case
'basis; it is not, as such, an organizing principle for distinguishing
jurisdiction or the lack of it under due process standards. The
same can be said of the relevance of the plaintiff's contact with
the forum.
Elsewhere in this issue," Professor Leflar writes of the double
edge of the due process standard for state judicial jurisdiction: as
a grant of power to the outer limits of justice and fair play and
as a constitutional guide for the appropriate use of that power.
Accordingly, he chides state legislatures for not giving more particular directions to their courts in jurisdictional matters. His
argument is obviously well taken and needs no paraphrasing here.
While I agree with Professor Leflar, I would make the point
in somewhat different terms. In one sense, the doctrine of
InternationalShoe, as an exercise in the development of the due
process clause, is a function of the Erie doctrine leaving to development by state law such matters not otherwise ordered by the
Constitution or federal law. In later cases, little is said of the
16. Time, distance, expense, the availability of witnesses and evidence-all pose
issues of convenience and even justice in a practical sense. They are distinguishable,
however, from such choice-of-law consequences as render one liable according to the law
of one state, but not according to the law of another. Hereupon might be constructed the
difference between practical litigational (or jurisdictional) forum shopping and dispositive
choice-of-law (or legislative) forum shopping.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1971) provides that:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought.
Compare § 1404(a) with 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1971) which provides that:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.
Despite or because of change of venue, choice-of-law problems may persist or arise. Under
which section would transfer be made in cases like Ratliff-Nichols? The answer may have
significant choice-of-law consequences. See text p. 211-13 infra.
18. Leflar, Barely Fair,Not Grossly Unjust, 25 S.C.L. Rv.177 (1973).
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function of the due process clause as anything more than an indulgent monitor. 9 To date, the use of the due process-clause as a
residual check has been the standard reaction to state expansion
of judicial jurisdiction. Federal courts have even accelerated this
expansion by interpreting state laws as intended to go to the outer
limits of the due process clause.20 The Ratliff-Nichols opinion
illustrates this aspect of the due process clause.
In another sense, though, International Shoe can be read as
something more than laying the basic foundation for establishing
the outer limits of state judicial jurisdiction. In International
Shoe Justice Stone offers the jurisdictional counterpart of ageneral theory for allocating the authority of the several states to
hear cases and to make rules to decide them. 2' The problems of
federalism require for their solution something more than an
either/or delineation of state and federal authority. A process of
flexible interplay between state and federal decisional authority
is needed.
19. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) jurisdiction was
upheld upon the basis of an isolated act. Consider, however, that a local plaintiff was suing
onf
a local cause of action. In writing for the majority Mr. Justice Black pursues the theme
of his concurring opinion in International Shoe: "[it cannot be denied that California
has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims." Id. at 223.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 247 (1958), with its formalistic analysis in terms of in
rem and in personam distinctions appears athwart the analytical development promised
by InternationalShoe as a general theory of the exercise of state court jurisdiction. That
Hansbn avoids a troublesome choice-of-law problem concerning the doubtful application
of the law of the after-acquired domicile to test the provisions of an intervivos trust see
Scott, Hanson v.Denckla, 72 HARv.L. REv. 695 (1959).
20. For an interpretation of South Carolina's long-arm jurisdictional ambitions see
Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102, (4th Cir. 1962). This expansive interpretation
of state law is approved" in Caroliria Boat and Plastic Co. v. Glascoat Distributors, Inc.,
249 S.C. 49, 152 S.E.2d 352 (1967). Both cases involved local plaintiffs and local causes
of action. By contrast, see Surinam Lumber Corp. v. Surinam Timber Corp., 259 F. Supp.
206 (D.S.C. 1966), where jurisdiction was refused when the only contact was the place of
incorporation of the plaintiff.
21. InternationalShoe schematically represents a part of a series of opinions by
Justice Stone. In this light, consider Stone's dissenting opinion in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933) (dealing with the recognition of sister state judgments and
the full faith and credit clause) and Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of Cal., 294 U.S. 532 (1932); and Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (workmen's compensation cases dealing with
choice-of-law). See generally Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59
HARv. L. REv. 1210 (1949). Cf. Currie, The Constitutionand the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the JudicialFunction, 26 CHI. L. RIv. 9 (1958), reprinted in B.
CURRIE, SELECTED

EssAYs

ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
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This reading of InternationalShoe is consistent with an understanding of Justice Stone's contribution to the better management of conflict of laws problems. The traditional divisions of
conflict of laws-jurisdiction, choice of law and judgmentshave been clarified by his opinions. As to each his approach appears twofold. There is a delineation of state and national authority in the federal system in terms of the negative implications of
constitutional provisions. There is also a functional examination
of the problem of allocating authority in terms of the relative
governmental interests of the involved states. This aspect is more
than a warning to the offending state that it is about to sail off
the edge of minimum contacts or to deny credit to a judgment
only minimally entitled to recognition. When one attempts to
balance governmental interests, the problems of federalism can
no longer be rationalized through merely the negative implications of due process or of full faith and credit.
Problems involving competing interests-whether between
states or between a state and the federal system-cannot always
be solved by a method seeking to determine that one has no
interest at all! 2 Too often the question is one of "a little more
or a little less."23 Of judicial jurisdiction Justice Stone says that
the demands of due process
; ..may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the
state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to de-

fend the particularsuit which is brought there. 4
What is needed is a more subtle process of management, an
affirmative development, or shared filling-in of a constitutionally
approved as distinguished from a constitutionally required doctrine of state court jurisdiction. 5 In the context of diversity jurisdiction, the issues in Ratliff-Nichols might productively be
22. "[The due process] clause does not contemplate that a state may make a binding
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties or relation." 326 U.S. at 319 [emphasis added].
23. Id.
24. Id. at 317 [emphasis added].
25. That reference is made to state law to determine jurisdiction in simple diversity
cases is the predominant view. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320
F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). Erie may not always compel such a balance. Id. at 226. Cf.
AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE, STUDY OF THE DisION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 133-34 (1969). See also Note, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1964).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss2/7

6

Felix: Diversity Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Of Strangers Bearing St

1973]

DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

viewed as arising out of the work-a-day operation of the federal
judiciary system rather than the Constitution upon which the
system is based. The federal courts are particularly apt partners
in this task for their own authority to apply law is in question.
The real difficulty, of course, is how to keep the Erie-Klaxon
doctrine with the due process clause as its policeman and at the
same time give scope to the federal courts in diversity jurisdiction
for participation in the management of the problems caused by
the fact of federalism. To move to a positive use of the due process
clause to structure state court jurisdiction may be said to tamper
unduly with the Erie-Klaxon doctrine. Such a move, moreover,
in the name of Federal Common Law,2" would be extravagant, for
it would only compound our problem. It would treat as a federal
question an issue presently over-litigated in the name of due process. What is properly indicated is a further relaxing of the idea
that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction is just another
state court. Elsewhere the priority of federal substantive 2 and
procedural interestss has been held to justify disregarding or departing from state authority. This departure is an accepted adjustment of the Erie doctrine. When the question of access to
diversity jurisdiction is presented in such a way as to justify a
decision free from state law regarding state judicial jurisdiction,
a decision can be based not on national or state but on "federal
courts" law.

EI.

DooR CLOSING

Ratliff-Nichols does not present issues of federal substantive
law or rules for the management of litigation. Plainly viewed, the
problem is one of the availability of the federal court. In Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc." the Supreme Court
introduced the notion of affirmative countervailing considerations. Later, in a notable opinion, the Fourth Circuit in Szantay
26. Cf. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964).
27. Consider the assertion of national interest in foreign relations in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), and in interstate commerce where the interest
of the government is directly involved in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943).
28. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
29. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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v. Beech Aircraft30 asserted its independence of South Carolina's
"door closing statute"3 that prevents non-resident plaintiffs trom
suing foreign corporations on causes of action not arising within
the state. The South Carolina federal district court was'deemed.
the most appropriate forum for a case that additionally involved
a domestic corporate defendant that could not be sue# elsewhere.
Judge Craven himself notes the case but, in deciding on due
process grounds, he finds no need to use it. The refusal to decide
a question of state court jurisdiction by reference to state law is
curious. Elsewhere in the opinion he notes that "oft repeated
test" that requires attention to whether state law provides for
jurisdiction before consideration of whether such assumption of
jurisdiction would violate the Constitution.2 It seems paradoxical
to approve of an approach only to adopt the opposite course. To
have disposed of the .case on state law grounds would have produced an opinion that does not perpetuate the notion that state
judicial jurisdiction extends to the abyss of due process. In this
sense, Judge Craven's technique is an intellectual tease, for the
due process issue should be moot. Professor Sedler's analysis of
the statute as a grant of jurisdiction well within due process limits
30, 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965). For a helpful note on this case see 17 S.C.L. REv. 631

(1965).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-214 (1962):
An action against a corporation created by or under the laws of any other state,
government or country may be brought in the circuit court: (1) By any resident
of this State for any cause of action; or (2) By a plaintiff not a resident of this
State when the cause of action shall have arisen or the subject of the action shall

be situated within this State.
32. "The oft-repeated test" was first stated in Pulson y. American Rolling Mill Co.,
170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1948):

There are two parts to the question whether a foreign corporation can be held
subject to suit within a state. The first is a question of state law: has the state
provided for bringing the foreign corporation into its courts under the circum-

stances of the case presented? There is nothing to compel a state to exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation unless it chooses to do so, and the extent

-to which it so chooses is a matter for the law of the state as made by its
legislature. If the state has purported to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign

corporation, then the question may arise whether such attempt violates the due
process clause or the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution. U.S.
Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.3; amend. 14. This is a federal question and, of course,

the state authorities are not controlling. But it is a question which is not reached
for decision until it is found that the State statute is broad enough to assert
jurisdiction over the defendant in a particular situation.

See also Clark v. Babbitt Bros., Inc., 196 S.E.2d 120 (S.C. 1973) (Jurisdiction of state
court irf
the first instance a question of state law).
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rather than a restriction, underscores this point.3 1 Professor Leflar's argument that state legislatures be more explicit and restrained in framing jurisdictional rules is also relevant. 4 The
South Carolina legislature has done just that with its "doorclosing" statute.
One might also chide the federal court for similar reasons.
Here a decisional "door-closing" based on federal jurisdictional
concerns might be thought appropriate. The explanation must be
sought in a proper approach to affirmative countervailing considerations. The district court, I think erroneously, took too literally
the idea of "affirmative" to indicate keeping the federal court
open when a state court Would close its doors. The crucial consideration seemed to be to avoid discriminating against plaintiffs
from other states. This is hardly convincing on the facts. "Affirmative" would better be read to indicate the presence of a federal
interest to be free of.state authority. Here, if anything, federal
policy mirrors state policy (to use hyperbole) ". . . not to so
extend the jurisdiction of the courts - . . as to open their doors
to any person, from any quart6r of the globe, to demand redress
for injuries received anywhere. . . ."I' This becomes all the more
clear in the case of federal courts when one considers the implications of assuming jurisdiction on choice of law, especially in the
event of transfer of venue.IV.

CHOICE OF LAW

Historically and analytically judicial jurisdiction and choice
of law are separable. According to traditional doctrine the decision to hear a case or not is unaffected by the choice of law to be
applied in disposing of the case.3 1 Recent developments, however,
show that while the issues are separable, they are not mutually
exclusive. In Ratliff-Nichols, absence of contact with the facts
giving rise to the claim for relief is a significant factor in the
court's decision to deny jurisdiction. If jurisdiction were allowed,
the lack of such contact would have to be considered in determin33. Sedler, The Truly DisinterestedForum, 25 S.C.L. REv. 185 (1973).
34. Leflar, supra note 17, at 177.
35. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Ga. Constr. Co., 32 S.C. 319, 346, 11 S.E. 192,
203 (1889).
36. See A. VON MEHREN &D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 599-601,
615-618 (1965).
37. The territorial vested rights theory of choice of law, epitomized by the First
Restatement, prescribed exclusive reference in tort cases to the law of the place where the
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ing which state's law to apply. 7 Long arm jurisdictional statutes
based on particular acts or transactions impose upon the court an
assessment of contacts which subsequently may determine choice
of law.18 The question may be asked: to what extent a court
should take choice of law into account in deciding whether to
assume jurisdiction? Both judges and academicians have urged
attention to choice of law in the solution of jurisdictional problems." Indeed the move toward a theory of forum conveniens
imports a complementary choice of law approach.
In Ratliff-Nichols the choice of law problem is nowhere mentioned. There is good reason for the court to avoid the determination of which statute of limitations to apply. The court would
then face a dilemma. The Erie-Klaxon doctrine requires that a
federal court in diversity jurisdiction apply the law of the state
in which it sits, including that state's conflict of laws rules. The
doctrine functions pragmatically for the most part to save federal
courts from unnecessary litigation and to leave to the states the
task of working out private law problems reserved to them by the
Constitution.' 0 Here, however, slavish application of the ErieKlaxon principle would appear to lead to the application of South
Carolina's six year limitation period and convert the federal court
into a clearinghouse for stale claims. South Carolina seems mired
in the "ice-age"'" of choice of law and would likely maintain a
injury occurred. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS OF LAw § 378 (1934). Under modem approaches
in cases where the place of injury is deemed "fortuitous" the significance of the place of
injury must be considered in the light of the particular issue presented before it can be
dismissed as such. See Babock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963). Further, the place of conduct retains choice of law vitality when the conduct
itself is at issue. Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
38. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-801 et seq. (1966). This specific jurisdiction
facilitates the legislative as well as the judicial jurisdiction of the state for local law will
often govern claims arising out of acts or activity upon which jurisdiction is specifically
based.
39. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEx. L. REv. 657 (1959); Eh'enzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction:The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); From StateJurisdictionto Interstate Venue, 50 ORE.
L. REV. 103 (1971).
40. See Cavers, Change in Choice of Law Thinking and its Bearing on the Klaxon
Problem, A.L.I. STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JUISDICTION BETwEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 154 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963); Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Processand
the FederalCourts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.732 (1963). Cf. Hart, The RelationsBetween
Federal and State Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 513-515 (1954).
41. The phrase is from Rosenberg, An Opinion for the N.Y. Court of Appeals, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1967). For a recent expression of choice of law method in South
Carolina, see Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); noted in 17 S.C.L.
REV. 305 (1965).
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characterization of the issue as procedural and thus regulated by
42
the law of the forum.

It should be noted that South Carolina does not have a borrowing statute that would provide a choice of law reference to the
limitation period of the state in which the cause of action arose.
This would limit the forum statute to cases in which the indicated
substantive issues are also governed by forum law. A borrowing
statute would, of course, perform the function of limiting access
to both state and federal courts and save everybody a lot of uncertainty. It is unlikely, however, that South Carolina can constitutionally be compelled to enact a borrowing statute.4 3 That is a
matter for state legislative law reform.4

Moreover, the application of the South Carolina six year limitation provision might not be that easy. Consider, for example,
that the complaint of plaintiff Ratliff alleges bodily injury resulting from negligence; carelessness; recklessness; willfulness; wantonness; breach of express and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for consumption; false, fraudulent, deceitful
and negligent misrepresentation-to all of which is added her
husband's claim for loss of consortium. With no express state
decisional authority regarding the basis of strict liability in such
cases, a question of characterization may arise." If tort is selected, the problem seems solved, for the statute is general
enough to accommodate a procedural classification for choice of
law purposes. If implied warranty is selected, however, the problem of extracting the six year limitation provision from South
Carolina's version of the Uniform Commercial Code is presented,
42. See Sawyer v. Macaulay, 18 S.C. 543 (1882). Cf. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 243 S.C.
286, 133 S.E.2d 809 (1963); Hemingway v. Shull, 286 F. Supp. 243 (D.S.C. 1968). For a
historical analysis of the statute of limitations in the conflict-of-laws see A. EHRENZWEIG,
CONFUCT OF LAWS, 428-436 (1962).
43. See generally Vernon, Some ConstitutionalProblems in the Conflict of Laws and
Statutes of Limitations, 7 J. PuB. L. 120 (1958).
44. See Note, Papciak u. Richardson-Merrel,Inc.-The case for a Borrowing State,
21 S.C.L. Rv. 82 (1968).
45. Clearly, the South Carolina version of the Uniform Commercial Code provides for
liability in implied warranty for bodily injury. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-318 (1966). There
is as yet no state supreme court decision applying the code provision in preference, say,
to the strict products liability provision ofREsTA
T'r (SEcoun) OF TORTs § 402A (1965).
Cf. Rutledge v. Dodenhoff 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970) (implied warranty of
habitability and workmanship in property damage claim against builder-vendor of new'
house). The federal courts assume quite soundly that South Carolina has or will impose
strict products liability in some form when the need arises. See, e.g., Smith v. Regina Mfg.
Corp., 396 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1968).
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for the Code provisions .governing substantive liability would not
apply. Practically, of course, the fact that all are six year provisions may moot the issue. But in theory one may wonder whether
there is a South Carolina limitation provision available to apply!
To return to the main point, the choice of law issue is analogous to the jurisdictional issue, but, under present authority, a
bad decision would follow. Constitutional policing of state choice
of law practices is done by application of the due process clause
as only a residual check against overreaching application of
forum laws. A state may not apply its substantive law to a matter
with which it has no contact." A six year limitation period is not
unjust as such in a due process sense. The characterization of the
issue as procedural, and the neutral application of the forum's
general limitation period to all claims before it, is probably not
invidiously discriminatory. 7 At any rate it is unlikely that the
indicated choice of limitation period can be constitutionally restricted to cases in which the forum's law will be applied to the
merits of the case. More precisely with respect to Ratliff-Nichols,
can the forum's statute of limitations be applied to a case that
cannot constitutionally be governed by its own law? Keeping in
mind the nearly total lack of local interest in the matter, it is not
to be doubted that the substantive claims may not be governed
by South Carolina law.
The dilemma thus becomes clear: apply the wrong law to the
case or revise the Erie-Klaxon doctrine. The analogy to the jurisdictional problem is also made clear. Given the negative use of
the due process clause to police state practices, fully rational
solutions in terms allocating the proper xeach of state laws and
the amenability to suit before state courts cannot be constitutionally compelled. The Supreme Court has endorsed a governmental
interest analysis but it has not yet compelled its use.4" To search
only for constitutional compulsions in diversity cases, however, is
to adopt too narrow a focus.
Forum shopping aid choice of law shopping are an inherent
46. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). The result would likely survive

today, but "the Supreme Court has discredited the vested rights theory upon which the
case rests and endorsed a government interest approach. Cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Off., 377
U.S. 179 (1964).
47. Cf. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
48. Cf. Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 909 (1971) (Klaxon doctrine inapplicable in case of "false conflict").
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aspect of federalism. So long as diversity jurisdiction persists, the
federal courts are partners in .the management of such problems.
Just as they are curbed in certain ways from fashioning rules for
jurisdiction and choice of law in matters reserved to the states,
they are, as part of a national judicial system, empowered to
reach solutions of such problems in ways not available to state
courts.4 9 Moreover, federal courts are charged with the distinctive
task of maintaining the national interest in the federal judicial
system not only in the sense of applying the federal rules of civil
procedure, but also in the sense of vindicating its institutional
needs. After all it is the federal, not the state, court that is being
asked to stay open six years to hear stale claims between strangers, and it is not a necessary (perhaps not even appropriate, to
say nothing of rational) function of diversity jurisdiction that it
do so.
Transfer of venue from one federal court to another comes
readily to mind. The order of the district court indicates that a
transfer of venue under § 1404(a) would be appropriate and that
plaintiff's choic' of law advantages should not be upset. Neither
point is beyond objection. Original venue, if technically proper,
points up the need for reform. The retention of the choice of law
advantage by plaintiff would demand reform, if not reversal.
When venue is proper originally and transfer is requested by the
defendant, the choice of law rules of the transferor forum are to
be applied. This proposition, announced in Van Dusen v.
Barrack,5 is less a matter of constitutional law than of construction of the statute authorizing transfer. Justice Goldberg purposely left open the answer to issues posed by variations from the
facts of the case before him.5 ' To show whether Ratliff-Nichols
should have the same choice of law result, the relation between
jurisdiction and venue in diversity litigation must be considered.
49. See, e.g., Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970) (Fashioning
a federal tolling principle in litigation brought in one federal court and then another).
50. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). See generally Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of
Laws: A Retraction, 27 CHI. L. REv. 341 (1960), reprintedin B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS
ON THE CONFuCT OF LAWS 431 (1963); Note, Erie, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of
Law in Diversity Cases, 53 VA. L. Rav. 380 (1967); Note, Choice of Law After Transfer of
Venue, 75 YALE L.J. 90 (1965); and AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 18-22, 149-155 (1969).
51. "In so ruling, however, we do not and need not consider whether in all cases
§ 1404(a) would require the application of the law of the transferor, as opposed to the
transferee, State. We do not attempt to determine whether, for example, the same considerations would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under § 1404(a) or if it was contended
Published
by Scholar
Commons,
1973
that the transferor
State
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The federal courts look to state law to determine the meaning
of "doing business" for the purposes of jurisdiction, but what
constitutes "doing business" for purposes of venue is governed by
federal law.52 We have in Ratliff-Nichols two examples of insufficient contacts to establish "doing business" as against due process limitations. To find upon the same facts that there is "doing
business" for venue purposes would seem an abuse of common
sense. Concededly there is in Nichols the added element of having
qualified to do business in the state, but this is immaterial for
jurisdictional purposes under state law. 53 The same conclusion is
therefore reached. Small wonder that the American Law Institute
has recommended modification of the venue statute to establish
limitations commensurate with jurisdictional developments. 4
As in Ratliff-Nichols, when venue is inconsistent with jurisdictional premises, choice of law consequences should be beyond
forum shopping strategies. Thus, original venue, even though literally proper, unsupported by proper jurisdiction should not control choice of law upon transfer. This approach is within the scope
of statutory construction. The federal court might thus reach a
proper result without foundering upon the Erie-Klaxon doctrine.
When venue is originally questionable and transfer is requested by the plaintiff, the law of the transferee forum should
apply. The case would be dismissed at the other end of the line

52. See 1 BARRON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 388-389 (Rev. ed.
C. Wright 1960).
53. See note 5 supra.
54. The pertinent provisions of 28 U.S.C. are:
§ 1391. Venue generally.
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial
district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district
shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
The 1966 addition to subsection (a) authorizing venue in the judicial district in which the
claim arose is in harmony with the trend toward specific (activity based) jurisdiction and
has manageable choice-of-law consequences. In this light, subsection (c) further authorized venue so as seemingly to exhaust the practical possibilities of corporate activity
generally, that is, in matters unrelated to the cause of action. The A.L.I. proposal would
no longer authorize venue on the basis that the corporation is "licensed to do business or
is doing business" in the judicial-district. A.L.I. STUDY, supra note 50, at 15-16, 135-150
(1969).
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because the transferee forum's statute to limitations has run. 5
When the defendant requests transfer of venue, the difference
between proper and questionable original venue would be even
more crucial. When venue is originally questionable it should not
matter that it is now the defendant who asks for transfer. To do
otherwise would give the plaintiff the benefit of questionable original venue and choice of law. Where, as here, the resulting choice
of law is also questionable, such an outcome would be untenable. 8
Given that upon present authority, venue is proper in one of
our cases, though perhaps not the other, a dismissal upon jurisdictional grounds is proper and practical. The anomaly of variable choice of law consequences depending on whether transfer is
under § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) speaks for itself. The further prospect of transfer under § 1406(a) for purposes of choice of law
dismissal elsewhere underscores the point in theory; to carry out
the transfer in practice to prove the point is unnecessary. Given
the district coiirt's handling of the state door-closing statute and
its overreading of Szantay, avoidance of a decision in terms of
countervailing considerations is another piece of judicial pragmatism. Practical solutions may be generally preferred, but some
day the case will come along that judicial pragmatism cannot
avoid on jurisdictional grounds. Then the issues raised here speculatively will have to be faced.
55. See Carson v. U-Haul Co., 434 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1970). Cf. Schwimley Motors,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Cal. 1967).
56. Cf. A.L.I. STuDY, supra note 50, at 18-23, 149-155 (1969).
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